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Neuroscientists are now discovering how hormones and brain chemicals shape social behavior, opening potential
avenues for pharmacological manipulation of ethical values. Here, we review recent studies showing how altering
brain chemistry can altermoral judgment and behavior, focusing in particular on the neuromodulator serotonin and
its role in shaping values related to harm and fairness. We synthesize previous findings and consider the potential
mechanisms through which serotonin could increase the aversion to harming others. We present a process model
whereby serotonin influences social behavior by shifting social preferences in the positive direction, enhancing the
value people place on others’ outcomes. This model may explain previous findings relating serotonin function to
prosocial behavior, and makes new predictions regarding how serotonin may influence the neural computation of
value in social contexts.
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Introduction
How does the brain produce moral behavior? What
biological mechanisms determine whether a given
individual harms or helps others? And can our
neurobiology be manipulated for good? Of late,
questions like these have arisen at the interface of
neuroscience, ethics, and the law. Here, we exam-
ine the contributions of a single brain chemical—
serotonin—to moral judgment and behavior.
Serotonin is a monoamine neurotransmitter that
is evolutionarily ancient and well preserved across
mammals. It is one of the most widely distributed
neurochemicals in the mammalian nervous system,
making its precise functions difficult to pinpoint;
however, serotonin is more concentrated in certain
structures than others. Anatomical studies illustrate
the highest densities of serotonin concentrations in
various limbic structures, such as the cingulate, en-
torhinal, insular, and temporopolar regions, along
with the ventral and pallidal regions of the striatum1
and the medial orbitofrontal cortex.2 Notably, this
set of regions bears a striking resemblance to the
so-called social brain3—those regions supporting
social cognition and decision making.
Not surprisingly, then, serotonin has long been
implicated in social behavior across species.4,5
For example, polymorphisms in the serotonin
transporter gene have been linked to personal-
ity traits related to aggression, neuroticism, and
impulsivity.6–11,30 In both primates and humans,
serotonin function tends to covary positively with
prosocial behaviors such as grooming, cooperation,
and affiliation, and tends to covary negatively with
antisocial behaviors such as aggression and social
isolation.12–19 Such prosocial and antisocial behav-
iors are likely precursors to human morality.20–22
Despite abundant evidence linking serotonin to
morally relevant social behaviors, the neurobiolog-
ical and psychological mechanisms mediating these
relationships remain unclear. A recent meta-analysis
encompassing 175 independent samples and over
6,500 total participants found a reliable inverse re-
lationship between serotonin and aggression, but
failed to identify the specific factors explaining the
heterogeneity in study outcomes.23 One challenge
facing research in this area is the complexity of
both moral behavior and the serotonin system it-
self. Understanding how serotonin modulates moral
behavior thus requires precise behavioral tools for
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measuring aspects of moral behavior, combined
with targeted pharmacological tools for manipu-
lating serotonin in the brain.
Moral codes dictate how people should treat one
another, and most of these focus on two facets of
social relationships. The first prescribes caring for
others and prohibits harm; the second relates to
the fair distribution of resources and reciprocity
in social interactions.24,25 Concerns for harm and
fairness play a central role in moral codes across
cultures,26 and there is some evidence that these
building blocks of morality shape social behavior in
primates.27–29
In the following, we present evidence that sero-
tonin modulates human concerns for harm and fair-
ness, and we examine the potential mechanisms.
We first consider how serotonin influences harm
aversion in moral judgment and aversive processing
more generally, and then examine how serotonin
shapes behavioral responses to fairness and reci-
procity. Finally, we synthesize these findings into a
theoretical process model whereby serotonin influ-
ences social behavior by shifting social preferences
in the positive direction, enhancing the value people
place on others’ outcomes. This is not a comprehen-
sive review; instead, we focus specifically on studies
conducted in humans employing controlled, exper-
imental manipulations of the serotonin system in
the laboratory. For a recent comprehensive review
of serotonin and social behavior, we refer readers
to Kiser et al.;5 for a discussion of genetic polymor-
phisms of the serotonin system and their relation to
social cognition, see Skuse.30
Harm aversion and morality
Violence toward others is restrained by a seem-
ingly deep-rooted aversion to harmful actions.31,32
Such harmaversion infuses moral judgments;33 peo-
ple tend to judge harming an innocent person as
forbidden, even when doing so would ultimately
achieve a greater good.34,35 Harm aversion appears
to shape judgments in moral dilemmas, in which
people must judge whether it is morally permissible
to harm one person in order to save many oth-
ers. One classic set of dilemmas involves a runaway
trolley that is heading down the tracks toward five
workers, who will die if you do nothing. In one vari-
ant of the problem (“switch”), you have access to a
switch that will divert the trolley onto a different set
of tracks, where there is a single worker. If you flip
the switch, the single worker will die, but the five
others will be saved. In another variant (“push”),
you and a large man are standing on a footbridge
over the tracks. You can push the large man off the
footbridge and onto the tracks, where his body will
stop the trolley before it hits the five workers. Al-
though the switch and push variants are matched
with reference to outcomes, people are much less
likely to judge it morally permissible to push the
man than to flip the switch.34–36
Why do people react so differently to the two sce-
narios? One influential hypothesis posits that per-
sonal cases like push elicit stronger emotional re-
sponses than do impersonal cases like switch, and
these emotional reactions drive harm-averse judg-
ments in the former to a larger extent than in the
latter.37 Incidental negative emotions like disgust
increase the likelihood of harm-averse judgments,
even when the emotions are unrelated to the dilem-
mas under consideration.38,39 Neuroimaging stud-
ies have demonstrated that harm-averse moral judg-
ments engage brain regions previously implicated in
emotional processing.34,40–42 Further evidence for
the relationship between emotional responses to
harm and moral judgment comes from a recent re-
port that physiological reactivity to witnessing fake
violent acts against people (vs. violent acts against
objects) predicted moral judgments; those people
who showed the strongest physiological reaction to
witnessing violent acts were the least likely to en-
dorse harming one to save many others.32
Note that most studies of moral judgment ask
participants whether it is morally permissible to ac-
tively cause harm, for example, “Is it morally per-
missible to push the man?” In these studies, negative
cues associated with the harmful action in question
could trigger a withdrawal reflex, making subjects
less likely to endorse active responses. We might ex-
pect this Pavlovian aversive withdrawal process to
be particularly strong in personal scenarios that of-
ten involve lurid descriptions of the violent actions.
There is some evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Increasing the vividness of the descriptions of harm
in moral dilemmas reduces endorsement of harm-
ful actions.43 Ugazio et al.39 found that disgust, a
withdrawal-related negative emotion, reduced sub-
jects’ endorsement of harmful actions, whereas
anger, an approach-related negative emotion, had
the opposite effect. Finally, Pasto¨tter et al.44 re-
cently reported that negative emotions reduced the
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endorsement of harming one to save many when
subjects were asked explicitly whether harming one
was morally permissible. However, negative emo-
tions increased the endorsement of harming one
to save many when subjects were asked explicitly
whether not harming one was morally permissi-
ble. In other words, negative emotions increased
the likelihood that subjects would say “no, that is
not permissible,” regardless of the question asked.
These findings support the notion that aversive
states promote behavioral withdrawal, which can
translate into harm-averse moral judgments when
those judgments are framed in relation to action
permissibility.
Serotonin and harm aversion
It turns out that serotonin has been implicated in
precisely this aspect of aversive processing—namely
behavioral withdrawal in the presence of aversive
cues. Early studies in rats demonstrated that global
brain serotonin depletion made them insensitive
to punishment.45 In humans, serotonin levels are
positively correlated with harm-avoidant person-
ality traits,46,47 and psychiatric disorders involving
aversive processing, such as anxiety and depression,
are associated with serotonergic abnormalities. The
precise motivational processes driving these find-
ings have been subject to a long debate that has
yet to be fully resolved.48–54 However, recent at-
tempts have made considerable progress, both by
integrating previous theories of serotonin function
and by extending the logic from existing computa-
tional models of dopamine.50,53,54
One current hypothesis is that serotonin plays a
key role at the intersection of aversion and inhibi-
tion. Under normal conditions, the presence of aver-
sive outcomes leads to behavioral inhibition, which
can manifest in a reduced probability of action or in
slowed response times. Modest depletion of brain
serotonin in humans abolishes this aversively mo-
tivated behavioral inhibition,4,55,56 suggesting that
serotonin is important for promoting behavioral
suppression or withdrawal in the face of aversive pre-
dictions. Note that behavioral inhibition in response
to aversive outcomes reflects at least two concurrent
processes: instrumental aversive predictions linking
actions to outcomes and Pavlovian aversive predic-
tions linking stimuli and contexts to outcomes. Re-
cent data suggest that serotonin mediates reactions
to the latter, Pavlovian process; serotonin depletion
abolished inhibition of responses in the presence of
aversive stimuli, regardless of whether the responses
themselves led to punishment.56
Serotonin’s involvement in these rather basic as-
pects of aversive processing suggests that its influ-
ence could translate upward into effects on moral
judgment. There is some evidence pointing in this
direction; neuroimaging studies of moral judgment
have shown that imagining harmful acts against oth-
ers engages brain regions with dense serotonergic
projections, including the anterior cingulate cortex,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), amygdala,
and striatum.34,40,42,57 Moreover, patients with dam-
age to the vmPFC show impaired harm aversion in
moral judgment, in the sense that they are more
likely to endorse harming one person to save many
others.58,59 If serotonin plays a key role in harm
aversion, could enhancing serotonin function pro-
duce effects on moral judgment opposite to those
observed in the vmPFC patients?
Crockett et al.60 tested this hypothesis by investi-
gating the effects of the selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram on moral judgments
in a set of moral dilemmas. Citalopram enhances
serotonin function by blocking its reuptake into
the presynaptic terminal following release, thus pro-
longing its actions in the synapse. The set of dilem-
mas included personal and impersonal variants sim-
ilar to the push and switch cases described above.
The effects of citalopram were contrasted with those
of atomoxetine, a noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor,
and placebo in a double-blind within-subjects study.
Relative to both atomoxetine and placebo, citalo-
pram made people less likely to endorse harming
one to save many others. In other words, citalo-
pram enhanced harm aversion in moral judgment60
(Fig. 1A).
Crockett et al. further examined whether individ-
ual differences in empathy moderated the effects of
the drug. On the basis of their scores on the Inter-
personal Reactivity Index,61 subjects were split into
high- and low-empathy groups. Subjects with lower
empathy scores showed almost no effect of citalo-
pram on moral judgment; the effect of the drug
in the group overall was driven almost entirely by
subjects with higher empathy scores, who showed a
strong effect of citalopram on judgment (Fig. 1B).
Subjects high in empathy may possess higher lev-
els of harm aversion at baseline, which were further
boosted by citalopram.
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Figure 1. Serotonin shapes moral judgments. (A) Relative to
placebo and the noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor atomoxetine,
the serotonin reuptake inhibitor citalopram made subjects less
likely toendorseharmingoneperson to savemanyothers, specif-
ically when harms were emotionally salient. (B) The effects of
citalopram onmoral judgdment were strongest in subjects high
in empathy. Figures adapted from Ref. 60.
Notably, the effects of citalopram on moral judg-
ment were specific to personal dilemmas involving
emotionally salient harms. Recall the data suggest-
ing that serotonin is critical for translating aversive
Pavlovian cues into behavioral inhibition.56 If a sim-
ilar process unfolds as subjects ponder moral dilem-
mas, then enhancing serotonin function could boost
subjects’ responsiveness to the aversive Pavlovian
cues present in the descriptions of the dilemmas,
making them more averse to the suggested harm-
ful action and more likely to disapprove of it. The
results described in Crockett et al.60 are consistent
with this proposal.
Blair31 proposed that human aggression is con-
strained by a “violence inhibition mechanism” that
initiates a withdrawal response when activated by
distress cues. We suggest that a similar mechanism
operates for imagined harms in the case of moral
judgment, which could account for serotonin’s par-
allel effects in inhibiting actual harms (in the case
of aggression) and imagined harms (in the case of
moral judgment).
Serotonin, fairness, and reciprocity
Humans are often selfish, but also care about the
interests of others—for example, people are some-
times willing to incur costs to achieve fair out-
comes, punish unkind behavior, and reward kind
behavior.62 Such social preferences may have played
an important role in human evolution, as they
could maximize one’s fitness in social contexts.62–65
Preferences for positive reciprocity (repaying kind-
ness with kindness) motivate cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas that pit personal profit against social
welfare. Preferences for negative reciprocity moti-
vate costly punishment of those who violate social
norms. Preferences for fairness motivate actions that
seek to establish equitable outcomes. Here, we re-
view evidence that serotonin modulates social pref-
erences across these domains.
Cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas have
been linked to serotonin function. One study found
that after 2 weeks’ treatment with citalopram, par-
ticipants were significantly less likely to behave in
a self-interested manner in a modified version of
the prisoner’s dilemma that allowed participants to
act selfishly, cooperatively, or charitably.66 Modest
depletion of brain serotonin levels produced the
opposite effect on cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma.67 These findings suggest that serotonin
function is related to positive social preferences, that
is, the positive valuation of others’ outcomes. How-
ever, one disadvantage of social dilemmas as mea-
sures of social preferences is their complexity. Prefer-
ences for positive reciprocity undoubtedly motivate
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma, but coop-
erative behavior is also sensitive to other factors,
most notably subjects’ beliefs about whether their
partner is likely to cooperate—subjects are more
likely to cooperate if they believe their partner will
also cooperate.62 These studies thus cannot estab-
lish whether serotonin modulates social preferences
themselves, or alternatively, the beliefs upon which
the preferences are predicated.
Preferences for negative reciprocity and fairness
have been extensively studied using the ultimatum
game (UG). The UG consists of two players, a pro-
poser and a responder, who must agree on a way
to share a sum of money, or neither will receive
anything. The proposer must offer a division of the
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sum to the responder, who must make a decision to
either accept or reject this proposal. If the respon-
der accepts the offer, both players are paid; if he
rejects, neither is paid. Perfectly selfish responders
will accept any nonzero offer, but responders with
preferences for fairness or reciprocity will reject of-
fers perceived to be unfair—typically less than about
30% of the stake.68 Rejecting an unfair offer satisfies
fairness goals because the resulting outcome—zero
for both players—is perfectly equitable. Rejecting
an unfair offer satisfies preferences for negative reci-
procity because it punishes the proposer, depriving
him of a larger amount.
Several studies have investigated the relationship
between serotonin function and responder behav-
ior in the UG. Emmanuele et al.69 reported that
platelet serotonin levels were inversely correlated
with responders’ rejection rates. However, given that
serotonin does not penetrate the blood–brain bar-
rier, plasma levels may not correspond to central
serotonin levels. A more recent study found that
the density of serotonin transporters in the dor-
sal raphe nucleus—a proxy measure for serotonin
function—was inversely correlated with responders’
rejection rates.70 Although these studies suggest an
association between serotonin and preferences for
fairness and reciprocity, pharmacological manip-
ulations have furthered these claims with causal
evidence.
Crockett et al.71 examined the effects of reduc-
ing serotonin availability on responders’ behavior
in the UG. Responders were more likely to reject
unfair offers following depletion of central sero-
tonin, relative to placebo.71 A subsequent study
tested whether enhancing serotonin function with
the SSRI citalopram would produce the opposite ef-
fect on rejection behavior. Relative to both placebo
and the noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor atomoxe-
tine, citalopram reduced responders’ rejection rates
in the UG.72 In both studies, the behavioral changes
resulting from the serotonin manipulations could
not be attributed to changes in mood, the ability
to inhibit motor responses, or judgments about the
fairness of the offers—suggesting that the manipu-
lations affected behavior by directly altering social
preferences.
Rejection of unfair offers in the UG can be
explained by either preferences for fairness or
preferences for reciprocity. Crockett et al.73 com-
bined pharmacological manipulations with func-
Figure 2. Serotonin shapes social preferences in the striatum.
(A) Relative to placebo, serotonin depletion blunted responses
in the ventral striatum during the receipt of fair offers in the
ultimatum game (UG). (B) Relative to placebo, serotonin de-
pletion enhanced responses in the dorsal striatum during the
rejection of unfair offers in the UG. Individual differences in
the effects of depletion on dorsal striatal activity were positively
correlated with individual differences in the effects of depletion
on rejection behavior. Figures adapted from Ref. 73.
tional neuroimaging to investigate how serotonin
modulates each of these preferences separately. Pre-
vious neuroimaging studies demonstrated that fair
social exchanges stimulate activity in the ventral
striatum and medial PFC,74–76 suggesting that ac-
tivity in these regions reflects preferences for fair-
ness. Crockett et al.73 examined the effects of sero-
tonin depletion on ventral striatal and medial PFC
responses to the receipt of fair offers in the UG,
and found that serotonin depletion blunted these
regions’ responses to fairness (Fig. 2A). Serotonin
levels, therefore, appear to positively correlate with
(neural) preferences for fairness.
Meanwhile, negative reciprocity has been associ-
ated with activation in the dorsal striatum. Neu-
roimaging studies found activation in the dorsal
striatum during retaliatory actions following both
reception and observations of unfair behaviors.77,78
This activity was only observed for effective pun-
ishment; symbolic reciprocal actions that did not
reduce the norm violator’s payoff did not stimulate
activity in the dorsal striatum.78 Furthermore, the
magnitude of dorsal striatal activity was correlated
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with the amount the subject was willing to pay to
punish the violator. Collectively, these findings sug-
gest that the dorsal striatum signals the instrumen-
tal value of negative reciprocity, consistent with its
broader role in goal-directed reward processing.79
Crockett et al.73 demonstrated that serotonin de-
pletion enhanced responses in the dorsal striatum
during rejection of unfair offers in the UG, relative
to placebo. This effect was specific to trials in which
subjects actively rejected the unfair offers, relative to
trials in which subjects simply received unfair offers
but did not have the opportunity to reject. More-
over, the effects of the serotonin manipulation on
dorsal striatal activity were positively correlated with
the effects of the serotonin manipulation on rejec-
tion behaviors (Fig. 2B). These results suggest that
the dorsal striatum plays a causal role in negative
reciprocity, and that serotonin levels are negatively
correlated with neural and behavioral preferences
for negative reciprocity.
The association between serotonin and social
reward processing dovetails with previous reports
linking serotonin function to the processing of non-
social rewards80,99,100 and recent studies showing
that social and monetary rewards engage overlap-
ping regions of the striatum.81,82 Collectively, these
findings indicate that the role of serotonin in value
computation goes beyond a simple enhancement
or inhibition of reward processing in general; in-
stead, serotonin’s effects appear to depend on the
social context. We suggest that serotonin ampli-
fies neural representations of positive social pref-
erences, whereas serotonin depletion shifts neural
value computations toward selfish or even nega-
tive social preferences. This perspective is consistent
with earlier behavioral research indicating a positive
correlation between serotonin function and proso-
cial behaviors, but goes a step further by propos-
ing how serotonin affects the preferences that drive
those behaviors (Fig. 3).
Synthesis: serotonin and social
preferences?
Our synthesis of experimental findings advocates
a causal role for serotonin in both harm aversion
and social preferences for fairness and reciprocity.
Could these two ostensibly distinct facets of morality
instead reflect a single underlying dimension? More
specifically, can harm aversion be thought of as a
type of positive social preference?
Figure 3. How serotonin shapes social preferences. (A) The-
oretical social preference profiles, represented as indifference
curves. All points on the curve have equivalent subjective value.
Pure selfishness (solid line) is represented by a vertical indif-
ference curve; for a given self-payoff, others’ payoffs do not
affect utility. Positive social preferences (dotted line) are repre-
sented by a downward-sloping indifference curve; altruists are
willing to sacrifice some of their own payoff to benefit others.
Negative social preferences (dashed line) are represented by an
upward-sloping indifference curve; spiteful individuals are will-
ing to sacrifice some of their own payoff to reduce the payoffs
of others. (B) Theoretical social preference profiles representing
inequality aversion and its hypothesized modulation by sero-
tonin. Inequality-averse individuals display downward-sloping
positive social preferences when they are in an advantageous po-
sition (to the right of the gray equality line), andupward-sloping
negative social preferences when they are in a disadvantageous
position (to the left of the gray equality line). We propose that
serotonin shifts social preferences in the positive (counterclock-
wise) direction.
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Figure 3A illustrates three theoretical social pref-
erence profiles, represented as indifference curves
(where all points on the curve have equivalent sub-
jective value). An examination of Figure 3A demon-
strates how harm aversion can be thought of as a type
of positive social preference. Individuals with pos-
itive social preferences show downward sloping in-
difference curves, which means that harm to others
results in utility losses for the self. As the indifference
curve rotates in the clockwise direction, preferences
move toward pure selfishness. Once the slope of
the curve is positive, we can see that the individual
in question displays negative social preferences—
in which harm to others results in utility gains for
the self. Counterclockwise rotations of the indif-
ference curve thus result in increased harm aver-
sion, whereas clockwise rotations of the indifference
curve result in decreased harm aversion.
Often the social context determines whether so-
cial preferences are positive or negative: one notable
example is inequality aversion.83 Inequality-averse
individuals (Fig. 3B) show positive social prefer-
ences when they are in an advantageous position
(to the right of the gray line denoting equal pay-
offs), and negative social preferences when they are
in a disadvantageous position (to the left of the gray
line denoting equal payoffs). The indifference curves
in Figure 3B capture most people’s behavior in the
UG.68
We suggest that serotonin shifts the slope of the
indifference curve in the direction of positive social
preferences. Crockett et al.71,73 demonstrated that
serotonin depletion amplifies negative social prefer-
ences under conditions of disadvantageous inequal-
ity (Fig. 3B, dashed line), whereas serotonin en-
hancement diminishes negative social preferences in
this setting (Fig. 3B, dotted line). Our model can also
account for previous studies of serotonin’s influence
on cooperation. Assuming that people are predis-
posed to cooperate in social dilemmas65 (i.e., that
their indifference curves are downward-sloping,
absent concerns about inequality), serotonin aug-
mentation should shift preferences further coun-
terclockwise, making people more cooperative,84
whereas serotonin depletion should shift prefer-
ences clockwise, making people less cooperative.67
Finally, previous studies have shown that sero-
tonin manipulations influence aggressive behav-
ior, particularly in people predisposed to aggres-
sion. Assuming that aggressive individuals have
upward-sloping indifference curves (i.e., they are
motivated to harm others) serotonin augmentation
again should shift preferences counterclockwise, re-
ducing aggression,85 whereas serotonin depletion
should shift preferences further clockwise, increas-
ing aggression.86–91
Our model is primarily descriptive at the behav-
ioral level, but makes predictions that can be tested
at the neural level. For example, value-processing
regions such as the ventral striatum and the medial
PFC show a pattern of activation consistent with
inequality aversion;76 we predict that serotonin ma-
nipulations would alter responses in these regions as
illustrated in Figure 3B (for preliminary evidence,
see Ref. 73).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that social cog-
nitive and emotional processes concerning the rep-
resentation of others’ mental states and emotions
(i.e., mentalizing and empathy) clearly play a role in
shaping concerns for harm and fairness.92,93 Recent
studies have shown that the structure and function
of brain regions involved in mentalizing, such as the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the superior
temporal sulcus, can predict positive social prefer-
ences and subsequent generosity.94,95 Similarly, re-
gions associated with empathy, such as the anterior
insula and anterior cingulate cortex, are sensitive to
the moral status of others96 and are correlated with
altruistic helping.97,98 A still-open question, there-
fore, is whether serotonin modulates moral behav-
ior indirectly by affecting empathic representations
in the TPJ, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex,
or directly by altering the neural computations of
social preferences in the striatum and the medial
PFC. Although initial evidence supports the latter
view,73 further work is needed in this area to under-
stand how individual differences in empathy mod-
erate the effects of serotonin on moral judgment
and behavior.72
Concluding remarks
Research into the neural basis of moral judgment
and behavior has exploded over the past decade.
The vast majority of this work has involved neu-
roimaging; these studies have provided valuable in-
sights into the neural correlates of moral decisions,
but are correlational in nature. More recent stud-
ies employing intervention methods, such as phar-
macological manipulations and brain stimulation,
have provided additional information about the
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brain systems that are causally involved in moral
decisions. Future work employing these techniques
will benefit from specified theoretical frameworks
that generate novel predictions about how targeted
interventions will modify moral judgment and be-
havior.
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